The Moise Assassination Convictions and the Quiet Power of 18 U.S.C. § 956

On May 8, 2026, a federal jury in the Southern District of Florida convicted four South Florida men of conspiring to kill or kidnap Haitian President Jovenel Moise, who was assassinated in his home outside Port-au-Prince in July 2021. Arcangel Pretel Ortiz, Antonio Intriago, Walter Veintemilla, and James Solages were each found guilty on five counts. The case took 39 days of testimony over almost nine weeks. None of the defendants pulled the trigger. None were in Haiti when Moise was killed. The killing happened on foreign soil, against a foreign head of state, by a team of Colombian operators. The charges still landed in Miami federal court, and the convictions still carry potential life sentences.

That outcome should get the attention of anyone with international business ties, financial relationships overseas, or any involvement, even at arm's length, with foreign political or paramilitary activity. The statute that did the heavy lifting in the Moise case, 18 U.S.C. § 956, is one of the most aggressive extraterritorial reach statutes in the federal criminal code. It does not require the defendant to leave the United States. It does not require the underlying violence to succeed. It does not require the defendant to be the principal actor. What it requires is conspiracy plus one act in U.S. jurisdiction. That is a low bar, and federal prosecutors are using it more.

The violence happened abroad. The prosecution still landed in Miami because the planning, money, and logistics touched South Florida.

What Actually Happened in the Moise Case

The verdict landed after a multi-week trial in Miami. Each of the four defendants was found guilty of conspiring to kill or kidnap a foreign leader, providing material support for the plot, and violating the Neutrality Act by undertaking an unlawful foreign military expedition. All five counts together carry maximum exposure of life imprisonment. A fifth defendant, Christian Emmanuel Sanon, will be tried separately for health reasons.

The government's theory at trial was that the defendants planned and financed the operation from South Florida, hired a contingent of former Colombian soldiers, and coordinated logistics for what was originally pitched as a coup or kidnapping but ended in the president's assassination. Solages was on the ground in Haiti. The other three were not. None of that mattered for the jurisdictional question. The acts of planning, recruiting, financing, and procurement happened in the Southern District of Florida, and that was enough.

How Section 956 Reaches Across Borders

Title 18, United States Code, Section 956 makes it a federal crime for any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to conspire with another to commit at any place outside the United States an act that would constitute the offense of murder, kidnapping, or maiming if committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The penalty is up to life imprisonment for the killing or kidnapping subsection. The statute also criminalizes conspiracies to damage property of foreign governments under a separate subsection.

The jurisdictional hook is broader than most people assume. The defendant must conspire with at least one other person, and at least one of the conspirators must commit an overt act within U.S. jurisdiction in furtherance of the agreement. That act does not have to be violent. It does not have to involve weapons. Booking a flight, sending a wire transfer, recruiting a participant, holding a meeting at a Miami restaurant, or sending a Signal message from a U.S. cell phone can satisfy the overt act requirement.

The statute also has no requirement that the underlying foreign act actually be completed. The conspiracy itself is the crime. A plot that was discussed but never executed, or that was disrupted before any harm occurred abroad, is still chargeable under § 956 if the planning happened on U.S. soil.

What Federal Prosecutors Are Doing With It

Section 956 has historically been a low-volume, high-profile statute. It was on the books for decades and rarely used outside the terrorism context. That is changing. The Moise case is one of several recent high-profile § 956 prosecutions out of SDFL, EDNY, and SDNY targeting plots tied to foreign governments, transnational organized crime, and politically motivated violence abroad.

The attraction for DOJ is straightforward. Section 956 lets federal prosecutors reach conduct that would otherwise belong to a foreign sovereign's criminal justice system, while sidestepping the proof requirements of more specialized statutes like the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the Hostage Taking Act, or the various terrorism statutes under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B. It is a clean conspiracy charge with extraterritorial teeth, and the venue defaults to wherever in the United States any meaningful planning occurred.

In SDFL specifically, the geography pulls in a wide range of cases. South Florida has been the planning hub for decades for activities involving Haiti, Venezuela, Cuba, Colombia, and increasingly Mexico and Central America. Money moves through Miami banks. Equipment passes through South Florida ports. Travel routes through Miami International. Any of those touch points can become the predicate U.S. act for a § 956 prosecution.

The Charges and the Companion Statutes

Section 956 rarely travels alone. The Moise indictment included a Neutrality Act violation under 18 U.S.C. § 960, which prohibits providing or preparing means for a military expedition against a friendly foreign nation from U.S. territory. That statute also has roots in the early republic and similarly low recent caseload, but it pairs naturally with § 956 in coup and paramilitary cases.

Material support charges under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A or § 2339B frequently accompany § 956 counts when the alleged plot has any nexus to a designated foreign terrorist organization or to support for activities the U.S. classifies as terrorism. Money laundering under § 1956 or § 1957 layers on whenever the funding moved through accounts in a way that obscures the source. Wire fraud under § 1343 captures the financial mechanics of recruitment, payment, and equipment procurement.

Sentencing exposure on § 956 itself is up to life when the conspiracy targets killing or kidnapping. The Sentencing Guidelines route the calculation through §2A1.5 (Conspiracy or Solicitation to Commit Murder), which produces a base offense level of 33 for the murder conspiracy track and 32 for the solicitation track. With aggravators for the use of weapons, vulnerable victim, or international terrorism nexus, the resulting guideline range can match or exceed the statutory maximum.

Mistakes That Trigger Section 956 Exposure

Most clients who end up facing § 956 charges did not see them coming. Three patterns recur.

The first is treating any conversation about a foreign political situation as protected speech with no criminal hook. Discussion of a regime change scenario over drinks is one thing. The same discussion combined with payment to operators, sourcing of equipment, or coordinated recruitment becomes conspiracy. The line is the agreement plus the overt act.

The second is moving money to overseas contacts for purposes the U.S. government may later characterize as material support. Wires to security contractors, payments to fixers, payments to political organizers in foreign countries, especially in jurisdictions like Haiti, Venezuela, Cuba, or Mexico, can be reconstructed years later by financial investigators. The original purpose of the wire matters less than what it can be made to look like through subpoena records and cooperator testimony.

The third is talking to federal agents without counsel because the conduct under discussion happened abroad and feels outside U.S. reach. It is not. Any conversation with HSI, FBI, or DEA touching on activity in a foreign country can produce a 302 that becomes the centerpiece of a § 956 indictment months or years later.

Strategic Defense in Section 956 Cases

The right defense posture in any § 956 matter starts with the jurisdictional analysis. The U.S. overt act has to be more than incidental presence. It has to actually further the agreement. Many § 956 cases turn on whether the alleged overt act, often a meeting, a wire, or a phone call, can be tied directly to the foreign violence rather than to lawful related activity.

Beyond jurisdiction, the strongest defenses tend to focus on the agreement element. Conspiracy requires a meeting of the minds on an unlawful objective. Defendants who were peripheral, who believed the activity was lawful, or who withdrew from the agreement before the overt act often have viable defenses that need to be developed long before trial. Cooperating witness credibility is almost always the central trial issue, because § 956 cases are typically built on insider testimony.

For clients who learn of an investigation early, before indictment, the strategic priorities are document preservation, disciplined refusal to make voluntary statements, and a careful proffer-versus-litigate analysis with experienced federal counsel. Cooperation in § 956 cases can produce substantial sentence reductions, but only if it is structured properly and timed correctly.

Why This Verdict Matters Beyond the Moise Case

The Moise convictions are not just a Haiti story. They are a signal about how DOJ is using § 956 to reach conduct that crosses borders, involves foreign actors, and would historically have been treated as a foreign sovereign's problem. Anyone with international business exposure, particularly in jurisdictions where U.S. interests are politically active, should treat the Moise outcome as notice that the planning side of any cross-border venture, even one that never materializes, can land in a federal courtroom in Miami.

For Florida clients specifically, the venue risk is real. SDFL is the natural forum for any case touching the Caribbean, Latin America, or international finance routed through South Florida. The federal prosecutors who tried Moise are still in the office, and the playbook they used will be applied again.

"Section 956 does not need the violence to happen here. It needs the planning to happen here, and that is where many people get trapped."— Aaron M. Cohen, AMC Defense Law

Facing a Section 956, Material Support, or International Conspiracy Investigation?

AMC Defense Law represents clients facing federal investigations and prosecutions involving extraterritorial conspiracy charges, material support allegations, and international financial misconduct. Our practice handles complex multi-jurisdictional matters with foreign nexus, parallel civil and criminal exposure, and high-profile sensitivities. We work as a federal criminal defense attorney and white collar defense attorney for clients who need early jurisdictional analysis, disciplined investigative response, and aggressive trial and sentencing advocacy. Every consultation is confidential and protected by attorney-client privilege.

If you have been contacted by the FBI, HSI, or a federal grand jury regarding activity with any international component, do not assume the geography protects you. Call AMC Defense Law to schedule a confidential case evaluation.

The best Section 956 defense work usually happens before indictment, when the government's theory can still be tested and challenged early.

If you or your loved ones have been arrested or are under federal investigation, call Aaron M. Cohen, 24 hours a day to get help.

This article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The information above describes federal extraterritorial conspiracy enforcement current as of May 2026. Outcomes in any individual case depend on facts, jurisdiction, and developments after publication. Reading this article does not create an attorney-client relationship with AMC Defense Law or any of its attorneys. For advice specific to your situation, contact a licensed federal criminal defense attorney directly.